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The Path to Obergefell: Saying “I do” to New Judicial 
Federalism? 
Christine L. Nemacheck* 
On June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court announced its decision in 
Obergefell v. Hodges1 and its companion cases. In summarizing the 
Court’s majority opinion from the bench, Justice Kennedy asserted 
that although liberty is most commonly protected by our democratic 
system, “there has been substantial public deliberation over the past 
decades and it is a central premise of our Constitution that 
fundamental rights depend on the outcome of no elections.”2 In 
deciding that the Constitution protected the right of couples, whether 
same or different-sex partners, the Court effectively removed the 
question of same-sex marriage from the legislative arena and the 
voting booth.3 More significantly for the manner in which the issue 
had been dealt with up to that point, Obergefell also ended the 
important role for state courts’ due process and equal protection 
analysis under their own state constitutions. Some forty-plus years 
after the Court had dismissed “for want of a substantial federal 
question,” a gay couple’s appeal of Minnesota’s refusal to grant them 
a marriage license,4 the majority held that based on the fundamental 
right to marry, and to ensure equal protection under the law, states 
 
 *  Wilson and Martha Claiborne Stephens Associate Professor of Government and 
Fellow with the Center for Liberal Arts at the College of William & Mary. I want to thank Nick 
LaRowe, Michael Fix, Tracey George and audience members at the 2016 Midwest Political 
Science Association’s annual conference for their helpful questions and comments on an earlier 
version of this paper. 
 1 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 2 Obergefell v. Hodges, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2014/14-556 (Opinion 
Announcement-June 26, 2015 (Part 1)). 
 3 Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 4 Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810, 810 (1972); JOSEPH MELLO, THE COURTS, THE 
BALLOT BOX, AND GAY RIGHTS: HOW OUR GOVERNING INSTITUTIONS SHAPE THE SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE DEBATE (2016). 
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must issue marriage licenses to same-sex as well as opposite-sex 
couples.5  
Interest groups and marriage equality supporters roundly lauded 
the Court’s decision in Obergefell. Groups like Lambda Legal, Gay 
and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (GLAD), The National Center 
for Lesbian Rights (NCLR), and the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU), had long been active in the legal and political campaigns to 
realize that goal. These groups developed sophisticated strategies, 
individually and in tandem, to advance gay rights, and eventually to 
achieve marriage equality nationwide.6  
The gay rights movement generally, and the fight for marriage 
equality in particular, are sometimes likened to the civil rights 
movement of the 1950s and 1960s. The prominence of Loving v. 
Virginia7 as precedent for the Court’s decision in Obergefell is just 
one of the reasons for such comparisons, as are the similarities 
between the legal roles played by organizations like Lambda Legal 
and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
Legal Defense and Education Fund.8 But there are also important 
differences between the movements that are crucial to understanding 
the path to marriage equality.9  
The main legal venue for achieving an end to legalized racial 
segregation, Jim Crow laws and anti-miscegenation statutes was the 
federal court system.10 But the state court systems played a far more 
 
 5 Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2607 (2015). 
 6 LOVE UNITES US: WINNING THE FREEDOM TO MARRY IN AMERICA (Leslie J. Gabel-
Brett & Kevin M. Cathcart eds., 2016). 
 7 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 8 ELLEN ANN ANDERSEN, OUT OF THE CLOSETS AND INTO THE COURTS: LEGAL 
OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE AND GAY RIGHTS LITIGATION (2006). 
 9 Beyond the differences I discuss here, there is disagreement about whether it is 
appropriate to compare the discrimination generally experienced by gays and lesbians to that 
experienced by African-Americans, particularly in terms of slavery, Jim Crow, and continued 
racism. See Karen Grigsby Bates, African-Americans Question Comparing Gay Rights 
Movement to Civil Rights, NPR (July 2, 2015, 4:30 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/2015/07/02/419554758/african-americans-question-comparing-gay-rights-
movement-to-civil-rights. My focus here is on the movements themselves, not on the kind or 
severity of the discrimination per se. 
 10 See MICHAEL J.  KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004); see also J.W.  PELTASON, 58 LONELY MEN: 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/16
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important role in the fight for marriage equality.11 The many reasons 
for the difference in strategies are beyond the scope of the present 
discussion, but the evidence is clear that gay rights groups 
strategically chose to wage their war for marriage equality in the 
states. This was not, however, a war they intended to win exclusively 
in those state courts. Instead, each victory they amassed in the states 
helped to shore up the final battle they intended to have before the 
United States Supreme Court to secure the right to marry as protected 
by the Constitution.12 
In a seminal 1977 law review article, Justice Brennan proposed 
new judicial federalism as a strategy to protect minority rights in the 
face of an increasingly conservative Supreme Court.13 He conceived 
new judicial federalism as a process of litigating cases in the state 
courts, relying on state constitutional law to protect individual rights 
and liberties.14 In this pages that follow, I examine the role of new 
judicial federalism in the fight for marriage equality. Did gay rights 
groups seize on new judicial federalism as a strategy to achieve 
marriage equality? Are state courts’ decisions on same-sex marriage 
in line with Justice Brennan’s idea of new judicial federalism? How 
does the ultimate nationalization of marriage equality in Obergefell 
comport with the idea of judicial federalism? 
 Here, I provide evidence that the Supreme Court’s 2015 
recognition of marriage equality was the culmination of new judicial 
federalism, albeit with an important twist. It represents strategic 
decisions made to win the right to marry in a subset, but not all, of 
 
SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1971). Congress was, of course, 
crucially important in the battle for civil rights as evinced by the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 
1964, the 1965 Voting Rights Act, and the 1968 Fair Housing Act, among others. But, here I 
am focused particularly on the role of the federal and state court systems.  
 11 Again, it can be noted that the gay rights movement was not focused exclusively on 
the courts. They placed significant importance on achieving progress in public opinion as well 
as in state ballot measures and state legislatures. Winning Marriage: What We Need to Do, NEW 
JERSEY WORKING GROUP (June 21, 2005), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2108219/final-marriage-concept-
paper.pdf. Here, however, I am focusing on the role of state courts. 
 12 Id. 
 13 William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 
90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). 
 14 Id. at 503. 
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the states before taking the issue to the Supreme Court.15 While 
Justice Brennan’s conception of new judicial federalism embraced 
state constitutional protection as an end in and of itself, leaders of the 
marriage equality movement clearly envisioned these victories as the 
means to a different end: protection under the Constitution.16  
NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM 
In reaction to what he saw as the paring back of civil liberties 
protections, particularly criminal suspects’ rights, by the Supreme 
Court, Justice Brennan published “State Constitutions and the 
Protection of Individual Rights,” in the January 1977 Harvard Law 
Review.17 In this article, Justice Brennan made both an objective 
argument about the roles of state and federal courts in a federal 
system of government and a normative argument about the 
responsibilities those state courts carried when the federal courts 
were willing to allow greater restrictions on individual rights through 
their analysis of the Constitution’s guarantees.18 Justice Brennan 
asserted that it is “both necessary and desirable” that no less than 
federal courts, state courts “are and ought to be the guardians of our 
liberties.”19  
Justice Brennan discussed the power of the state courts to make 
decisions in cases concerning individual rights based exclusively on 
their own state constitutions.20 He emphasized that even on issues to 
which the federal constitution applies, the state court could and 
should independently rely on its state constitutional provisions to 
resolve the case.21 Further, he argued, if a state constitutional 
provision is identical to the federal provision, it remains the authority 
of the state court to interpret its own constitutional provision to 
 
 15 Winning Marriage: What We Need to Do, supra note 11. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Brennan, Jr., supra note 13.  
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. at 491.  
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. at 491. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/16
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provide greater protection than the federal courts have understood its 
companion clause in the Constitution to provide.22  
Justice Brennan cited several state high court opinions to support 
his argument.23 One case, in which the Hawaii Supreme Court relied 
on its own interpretation of a Hawaii constitutional provision that was 
identical to a United States Constitutional provision, the Hawaii court 
observed that while relying on its own provision “results in a 
divergence of meaning between words which are the same in both 
federal and state constitutions, the system of federalism envisaged by 
the Constitution tolerates such divergence where the result is greater 
protection of individual rights under state law than under federal 
law.”24  
Justice Brennan’s call for renewed use of judicial federalism has 
been the subject of significant scholarship.25 Evidence from a number 
of empirical studies of state court reliance on their own state 
constitutions is perhaps mixed at best.26 Although various studies do 
indicate that states cited their own state constitutions more frequently 
in the years after Brennan’s call,27 it is not clear that those cases lead 
to an expansive interpretation of rights protection nor that state courts 
relied on their own constitutions to the exclusion of the United States 
Constitution.28 Instead, several studies cited a lock-step decision 
pattern where the state court application of its own constitution fell in 
line with the federal courts interpretation of its similar provision.29 
 
 22 Id. at 500. 
 23 Id.  
24 Id. at 500.  
25 E.g., Louise Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1191 (1977); Earl M. 
Maltz, False Prophet—Justice Brennan and the Theory of State Constitutional Law, 15 
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 429 (1988); Barry Latzer, The New Judicial Federalism and Criminal 
Justice: Two Problems and a Response, 22 RUTGERS L. J. 863 (1991); G. Alan Tarr, The Past 
and Future of the New Judicial Federalism, PUBLIUS: J. OF FEDERALISM, Spring 1994, at 63; G. 
Alan Tarr, New Judicial Federalism in Perspective, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1097 (1997). 
 26 Craig F. Emmert & Carol Ann Traut, State Supreme Courts, State Constitutions, and 
Judicial Policymaking, 16 JUST. SYS. J. 37 (1992).  
 27 John Kincaid & Robert F. Williams, The New Judicial Federalism: The States’ Lead 
in Rights Protection, 65 J. OF ST. GOV’T 50 (1992). 
 28 Latzer, supra note 25, at 863; Emmert & Traut, supra note 21, at 37. 
 29 Id. at 39. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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In addition to empirical evidence that calls into question the 
effectiveness of new judicial federalism, it has also been criticized as 
a framework for understanding the appropriate roles of state and 
federal courts in a federal system. In his discussion of the concept, 
particularly as it concerns aspects of the criminal justice system, 
Barry Latzer criticized the confusion new judicial federalism may 
create for law enforcement.30 And, in a more general sense, Latzer 
argued against state courts employing new judicial federalism to 
essentially subvert federal law.31 Within the context of same-sex 
marriage, others have pointed out the limitations inherent when rights 
protection is provided by the state courts; if it is a compromise 
allowing some states to protect individual rights and others to avoid 
doing so, “marriage equality is an oxymoron.”32 
While the evidence for the “success” of new judicial federalism is 
mixed, it bears considering how “success” is defined. As an end in 
itself, it may well be the case that new judicial federalism fails to 
fulfill its promise as an alternative to a progressive Supreme Court 
protecting individual rights and liberties articulated in the 
Constitution. But, as a means to an end, in this case protecting the 
fundamental right to marry the person of one’s own choosing, the 
fight for marriage equality provides strong evidence of its potential. 
MARRIAGE EQUALITY AND NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM 
When it had an early opportunity to adjudicate the question of 
same-sex marriage, the Supreme Court dismissed a challenge to 
Minnesota’s marriage statute for want of a substantial federal 
question.33 Given the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to consider 
same-sex marriage, one strategy for pursuing marriage equality 
 
30 Latzer, supra note 25, at 863. 
31 Id. 
32 Mae Kuykendall, The Converging Logic of Federalism and Equality in Same-Sex Marriage 
Recognition, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY ISSUE BRIEF 2 (Sept. 2012), 
http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Kukendall_-
_Converging_Logic_of_Federalism_and_Equality_0.pdf. 
33 Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/16
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would have been for proponents to move the debate to a different 
venue. Indeed, this is exactly what Justice Brennan asserted ought to 
happen in his seminal piece on judicial federalism. But, especially in 
the 1970s, it was not clear there was a “gay rights strategy” generally, 
let alone a movement for same-sex marriage.  
The few cases that came in the aftermath of Baker v. Nelson were 
uncoordinated attempts by gay and lesbian couples to pursue 
marriage (or in at least one case, divorce).34 There were at least four 
more failed efforts to obtain the right to marry for same-sex couples 
during the 1970s and early 1980s. The cases occurred in both the 
federal and state courts, including Kentucky, Washington, Colorado, 
and Pennsylvania.35 In every case, the couples asking for recognition 
(or dissolution) of same-sex marriage were unsuccessful.36 In 
addition to these failed judicial efforts in states with traditional 
marriage laws, there were also a number of early legislative defeats 
as some states began enacting laws that explicitly banned same-sex 
marriage.37 Maryland was the first to do so in 1973.38 
In these early years of the gay rights movement, there were 
significant debates about whether the LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
and transgender) community should work toward a goal of marriage 
equality at all. Some argued that marriage itself was a patriarchal 
institution that gay and lesbian couples ought to avoid altogether.39 
 
 34 In one Pennsylvania case that reached the Pennsylvania Superior Court, the appellant, 
asserting they had entered into a common-law marriage in 1970, asked the court to grant a 
divorce in 1984. DeSanto v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984). 
 35 DANIEL R. PINELLO, AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 22 (2006); 
LESLIE J. GABEL-BRETT & KEVIN M. CATHCART, LOVE UNITES US 6–7 (Kevin M Cathcart & 
Leslie J. Gabel-Brett eds., 2016) (Introduction). 
 36 MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND 
THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (2013); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., THE FIRST 
MARRIAGE CASES, 1970-74, LOVE UNITES US (Kevin M. Cathcart & Leslie J. Gabel-Brett eds., 
2016); PINELLO, supra note 35; GABEL-BRETT & CATHCART, supra note 35.  
 37 KLARMAN, supra note 35, at 21–22. 
 38 SHARON LATTMAN-HICKS, PUTTING FAITH TO THE TEST: BLACK LEADERS AND THE 
MARYLAND VICTORY in LOVE UNITES US 203 (Kevin M. Cathcart & Leslie J. Gabel-Brett eds., 
2016); Winning the Freedom to Marry Nationwide: The Inside Story of a Transformative 
Campaign, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/how-it-
happened#section-2. 
 39 ESKRIDGE, supra note 35. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Rather than embracing traditional marriage and its emphasis on 
ownership and property, these activists argued that gay and lesbian 
couples ought to seek acceptance of their relationships despite their 
differences and outside the scope of marriage.40 
There was agreement among gay rights activists that state sodomy 
laws, which in the early 1960s existed in all fifty states, did 
significant damage to same-sex couples.41 Sodomy laws became a 
vehicle used to harass gay and lesbian couples; convictions under 
these laws also perpetuated discrimination in employment, as well as 
child custody rights.42 However, a combination of factors, including 
the development of a new Model Penal Code absent a sodomy 
provision, adopted by states beginning in 1961, as well as the 
movement towards women’s liberation and reproductive rights, led 
some states to decriminalize same-sex intimacy.43 Illinois was the 
first state to remove its sodomy law in 1961; Connecticut became the 
second to do so in 1971.44 States continued to remove or revise their 
sodomy statutes through the modification of their penal codes 
through the 1970s. But, as legislative revisions of penal codes slowed 
down toward the end of the 1970s, so did state action to legislatively 
remove sodomy laws. In some states, efforts to eliminate sodomy 
laws moved to the state courts. New York and Pennsylvania were the 
first states to decriminalize sodomy through the courts; each did so in 
1980.45 
In 1982, the ACLU of Georgia found a good test case through 
which to mount a constitutional challenge to that state’s sodomy 
statute. Michael Hardwick, a gay man living in Atlanta, was arrested 
 
 40 PAULA L. ETTELBRICK, SINCE WHEN IS MARRIAGE A PATH TO LIBERATION? in LOVE 
UNITES US 34 (Kevin M. Cathcart & Leslie J. Gabel-Brett eds., 2016). 
 41 KEVIN M. CATHCART, THE SODOMY ROUNDTABLE in LOVE UNITES US 51 (Kevin M. 
Cathcart & Leslie J. Gabel-Brett eds., 2016). 
 42 Id.  
 43 Id. at 52–53. 
 44 Id. at 51–52. 
 45 See Melinda D. Kane, Timing Matters: Shifts in the Causal Determinants of Sodomy 
Law Decriminalization, 1961-1998, 54 SOC. PROBS. 211 (2007). More importantly, during the 
1960s and 1970s, the United States Supreme Court had also made important strides in 
recognizing a constitutional right to privacy. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/16
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for having private, consensual sex in his own home. Even though the 
district attorney refused to prosecute, Hardwick took the case to 
federal court to argue that the law unfairly targeted him.46  
Hardwick’s case provided a vehicle through which gay rights 
advocates could work cooperatively. While working on the case in 
1983, Abby Rubenfeld—then legal director of Lambda Legal—
organized a group to coordinate gay rights advocates’ efforts to fight 
sodomy laws; that group was known as the Ad Hoc Sodomy Task 
Force.47 The Task Force, in different configurations over time, was 
essential in developing a national strategy to eradicate sodomy laws 
across the United States.48 But the first case on which they were 
involved was anything but successful. 
Justice Brennan’s new judicial federalism might have guided the 
Task Force toward a state-centric strategy, but Hardwick had 
challenged the constitutionality of the Georgia statute in the Federal 
District Court in Georgia, so they instead took the case on appeal to 
the Supreme Court.49 It led to a brutal defeat. In Bowers v. Harwick, 
the Supreme Court reached a 5-4 decision upholding the Georgia 
law.50 The majority narrowly framed the legal question to conclude 
that the Constitution did not provide a fundamental right to engage in 
homosexual sodomy.51  
Over the late 1980s and 1990s, the Sodomy Law Task Force met 
to develop strategy and share ideas about how to best focus their 
efforts on eliminating state sodomy laws in the wake of Bowers.52 
There were four primary gay and lesbian legal organizations that 
formed the heart of this group: Lambda Legal, the Gay and Lesbian 
Advocates and Defenders (GLAD), the National Center for Lesbian 
Rights, and the ACLU. As they continued their work nationwide, 
they became known as the LGBT Litigator’s Roundtable (the 
 
 46 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 47 Cathcart, supra note 41, at 53. 
 48 Cathcart, supra note 41. 
 49 Bowers, 478 U.S. 186. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Cathcart, supra note 41, at 54. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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“Roundtable”). The strategy on which the Roundtable focused 
reflected Justice Brennan’s new judicial federalism. Having found the 
federal courts, and particularly the Supreme Court unwilling to 
provide protection to gays and lesbians, they took their fight to the 
states.53 Between 1986 and 2003, LGBT groups generally, and the 
Roundtable specifically, work to eliminate fully one-half of the 
remaining state sodomy laws; that number of states with such laws 
fell from twenty-six to thirteen.54 And, in 2002, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to another case that had been making its way 
through the state court system, this one in Texas: Lawrence v. 
Texas.55 
Just as gay rights groups would later worry that they were 
bringing marriage equality cases to the Supreme Court too soon, 
groups fighting sodomy laws were concerned that filing for a petition 
for a writ of certiorari at the Court could result in a setback in what 
had been a successful march to repeal sodomy laws in the states. Paul 
Smith, the attorney who argued Lawrence on behalf of Lambda 
Legal, wrote that one of the first questions the group asked him was 
whether it was “too risky to go back to the Supreme Court with such 
an important case at that stage of history.”56 Given that Bowers was 
established precedent, Smith thought it was unlikely that the Court 
would grant cert unless it was going to overrule Bowers.57 Years 
later, when litigators would have to decide whether to bring marriage 
equality cases to the Court, they would face the same concerns.  
It was, of course, the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. 
Texas in which it overturned Bowers and ruled that the Constitution 
protected same-sex intimacy between consenting adults.58 Key to the 
Court’s decision in Lawrence was a 1996 decision striking down a 
Colorado state constitutional amendment. That Colorado amendment 
 
 53 Cathcart, supra note 41, at 53–54. 
 54 Cathcart, supra note 41. 
 55 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 56 PAUL SMITH, ARGUING LAWRENCE V. TEXAS AT THE SUPREME COURT in LOVE UNITES 
US 66 (Kevin M. Cathcart & Leslie J. Gabel-Brett eds., 2016). 
 57 Id. 
 58 Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/16
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barred localities from including sexual orientation as a category along 
with others such as race and sex, on which they could prohibit 
discrimination.59 The Court’s rejection of animus toward 
homosexuals as a legitimate government interest was crucial to both 
the Romer v. Evans majority and the majority in Lawrence, even 
though the former was based in an equal protection analysis and the 
latter relied on due process protections.  
 The Romer majority’s reasoning that moral disapproval was 
not a permissible basis for singling out homosexuals for disparate 
treatment under the law was particularly important in the Court’s 
decision to overturn Bowers.60 Writing for the majority in Lawrence, 
Justice Kennedy cited Romer’s determination that the constitutional 
provision was “born of animosity toward the class of persons 
protected.”61 In Lawrence, the majority went even further to note that 
were they to apply Romer’s equal protection analysis, they could 
reach a decision without reconsidering Bowers v. Hardwick.62 But 
they refused to do so. Finding no legitimate interest in the state’s 
legislation, the Court overturned Bowers. Not doing so, Justice 
Kennedy wrote, “demeans the lives of homosexual persons.”63 In 
striking down the Texas sodomy statute on the grounds that it 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, the 
Lawrence majority invalidated each of the thirteen remaining state 
sodomy.64  
The Court’s decision in Lawrence was a clear victory for gay 
rights advocates, but it also sounded the alarm for those opposed to 
same-sex marriage. In concluding the majority opinion, Justice 
Kennedy wrote that the case “does not involve whether the 
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that 
homosexual persons seek to enter.”65 In his dissent, Justice Scalia 
 
 59 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 60 Id. 
 61 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 634). 
 62 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558. 
 63 Id. at 575. 
 64 Id. at 578. 
 65 Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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made his view of Justice Kennedy’s assertion clear: “Do not believe 
it.”66 Justice Scalia’s dissent alerted its readers to the coming threat, 
or promise depending on the readers’ views, of marriage equality. 
According to Justice Scalia, the majority had applied “an unheard-of 
form of rational basis review”67 through which “all morals 
legislation,” including laws that would limit marriage to opposite-sex 
couples, were effectively eliminated.68 On that point, Justice Scalia 
and many gay rights activists agreed; having achieved their goal to 
eliminate state sodomy laws, they fixed their sites on marriage 
equality.69 
Eighteen months after the Court invalidated sodomy laws, a group 
of gay rights leaders met in Jersey City, New Jersey. The group 
included the members of the Roundtable, as well as the leaders of 
several other organizations fighting for gay rights. While the 
members did not all agree that pursuing marriage equality was the 
best path toward gay rights more generally, they did agree that given 
the legal and political circumstances in 2005, prioritizing marriage 
equality was the best course.70  
They also agreed that the fight was one that should occur in the 
states, not the federal government.71 The experience of losing Bowers 
had to have played into this calculation. In a document, “Winning 
Marriage,” that emerged from the Jersey City meetings, the 
participants make clear that while the goal was marriage equality 
across the United States, they expected to go to the federal 
government only once they had largely secured that right in the 
states; new judicial federalism was instrumental in decriminalizing 
sodomy and would also be the path toward marriage equality.72 Matt 
Coles, Director of the ACLU’s Center for Equality and a participant 
 
 66 Id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 67 Id. at 587. 
 68 Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 69 Winning Marriage: What We Need to Do, supra note 11.  
 70 MATT COLES, THE PLAN TO WIN MARRIAGE in LOVE UNITES US 100, 105–06 (Kevin 
M. Cathcart & Leslie J. Gabel-Brett eds., 2016). 
 71 Id. at 104. 
 72 MARK SOLOMON, WINNING MARRIAGE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW SAME-SEX 
COUPLES TOOK ON THE POLITICIANS AND PUNDITS—AND WON, 95–96 (2014). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/16
Document7  12/22/2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017]  Saying “I do” to Judicial Federalism? 161 
 
 
at the Jersey City meetings, made clear, “the effort should start in the 
courts . . . in the states where the odds of winning were strongest and 
the odds of a repeal by initiative were smallest.”73 Coles 
acknowledged that this strategy was not new; it was essentially the 
one groups had used to achieve success in Lawrence, 74  new judicial 
federalism.  
As leaders from various interest groups met to discuss the best 
strategy, Coles described a thought experiment one of the Jersey City 
participants suggested. The group was asked to think about what 
could be accomplished in particular states over the next ten to fifteen 
years.75 The result of this experiment is what came to be known as 
the 10/10/10/20 plan.76 The group developed a list of ten states in 
which they thought they might be able to achieve marriage quality in 
the next ten to fifteen years, another ten over that same time period in 
which they might be able to achieve full civil unions—not marriage, 
but with all of the protections typically afforded married couples, 
another ten in which they might be able to secure domestic 
partnerships—with some of the protections of marriage, and twenty 
other states in which the best they might hope for was improving the 
political and social climate for gays and lesbians and their families.77 
Over the next ten years, gay rights activists largely pursued a new 
judicial federalism strategy in attempting to win nationwide marriage 
equality. They had already garnered some success in the states, 
beginning with Massachusetts in 2003. Paramount among the 
activists’ concerns was preserving marriage equality in 
Massachusetts and establishing marriage rights for same-sex couples 
in two to three more states over the next four to five years.78 
Following their 10/10/10/20 plan, they did not seek to win marriage 
equality in every state in the United States; their goal was to win 
 
 73 Coles, supra note 71, at 104. 
 74 Id.  
 75 Id. at 105. 
 76 Id.  
 77 Id. 
 78 SOLOMON, supra note 68; Winning Marriage: What We Need to Do, supra note 11, at 
4. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
Document7  12/11/17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
162 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 54:149 
 
 
enough states and influence enough people that they might persuade 
the Supreme Court or Congress to act: 
Once enough Americans agree that it is wrong to exclude same-
sex couples from marriage, and enough states give complete legal 
protection to same-sex couples (mostly, but not entirely, through 
marriage), with others giving limited protection as well, the push to 
get the federal government to require all states to open marriage 
should probably get under way.79 
 Although there is significant evidence that gay rights activists 
consciously pursued marriage equality through heavy reliance on new 
judicial federalism, the strategy included several important 
distinctions from Justice Brennan’s vision. While Brennan’s call 
began and ended in the states courts, 80 the goal for gay rights 
activists was nationwide recognition of marriage equality. Victories 
in the state courts were stepping stones on the path to that national 
recognition. 
 Activists also saw public education and building public 
support as important factors in the equation leading to marriage 
equality. The document emerging from the meetings in Jersey City 
emphasized the importance of winning not only in the courtroom, but 
also in the court of public opinion. 
While a significant body of research exists on the marriage issue, 
much of it has focused on how to defeat particular constitutional 
ballot measures and not on how to move public opinion on the issue 
of marriage for same-sex couples itself. An innovative, in-depth and 
creative approach to research, message development, and message 
dissemination—particularly messages that focus on why marriage 
represents fairness and the full measure of equality and how to get 
people to care more deeply about it—is critical.81 
To the extent that efforts to move pubic opinion are aimed at 
achieving success by getting state courts to embrace their own state 
constitutional protections, these efforts are consistent with Brennan’s 
purely legal argument for new judicial federalism.  
 
 79 Winning Marriage: What We Need to Do, supra note 11, 12 at 5–6. 
 80 Brennan, supra note 13. 
 81 Winning Marriage: What We Need to Do, supra note 11, at 7. 
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 But, the Jersey City group saw a clear path for the shift from 
state to federal protection of marriage equality even before the federal 
courts might act to bring recalcitrant states into line by recognizing 
protections for marriage equality under the Constitution.82  They 
figured it was likely that the federal courts, or perhaps Congress, 
would act to “end discrimination against same-sex relationships that 
have been sanctioned by the states.”83 Of course, the Supreme Court 
was called on to do just that in Windsor.84 
 In the wake of early same-sex marriage cases like Baker v. 
Nelson,85 some states reacted by instituting defense of marriage acts. 
In 1996, Congress followed suit and passed the federal Defense of 
Marriage Act, signed into law by President Bill Clinton.86 That Act 
stated that the federal government would not recognize same-sex 
marriage, even if it were legally performed in a state that did grant 
such recognition. In February 2011, the Obama Administration 
announced that it believed the federal DOMA to be unconstitutional 
and would no longer defend the law in court. Given that lack of 
administrative support and, more importantly, that some states had 
begun recognizing same-sex marriages, it was only a matter of time 
until a case involving the federal government’s refusal to recognized 
a legal same-sex marriage made its way to the courts. In fact, it was 
about two years. 
 
 The 2013 case heard by the Supreme Court concerned a 
surviving spouse’s use of a marital exemption from federal estate tax. 
Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer had been together for over forty years 
by the time they were legally married in Ontario Canada in 2007. 
New York, where Windsor and Spyer resided, began recognizing 
same-sex marriages performed in other jurisdictions in 2008. When 
Spyer died, in 2009, the federal DOMA barred Windsor from a 
 
 82 Id. at 14–15. 
 83 Id. at 14. 
 84 United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2679 (2013). 
 85 Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). 
 86 The Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996). 
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marital exemption, since the federal government did not recognize 
her marriage.87 
A five-Justice majority, which would be mirrored two years later 
in an even more far-reaching marriage equality decision, held that the 
federal DOMA was unconstitutional.88 First, the majority reinforced 
the states’ primacy in defining and recognizing marriage. 89 In failing 
to recognize state-sanctioned marriage, DOMA flew in the face of 
that long-standing rule. By refusing to recognize a class of 
individuals the state sought to protect, the Court ruled that the federal 
DOMA violated those persons’ liberty protected by the Fifth 
Amendment. In the opinion, Justice Kennedy also noted that by the 
time Windsor was decided by the Supreme Court, New York, as well 
as eleven other states and the District of Columbia, also allowed 
same-sex marriage. 90 In doing so, the Court recognized the back and 
forth between the state and federal courts as they established further 
protections on the road to marriage. Many of these states had 
recognized marriage equality as protected by their own state 
constitutions. That might lead to the kind of protection Justice 
Brennan envisioned when he wrote about new judicial federalism in 
1977, but state protections alone would not provide full recognition; 
they did not provide equality. The existence of the federal DOMA 
allowed the Court to take the next step toward marriage equality at a 
time when only a minority of states recognized it.   
After the Supreme Court struck down the federal Defense of 
Marriage Act in 2013, the federal courts seemed to be reading from 
the Jersey City group’s playbook.91 With Windsor as precedent, 
legally married same-sex couples took to the federal courts to force 
states to recognize legal marriages performed elsewhere and to 
provide same-sex marriage within their own jurisdictions. Federal 
 
 87 Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2682. 
 88 Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the Court and was joined by Justices Ginsburg, 
Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas and Alito 
filed a number of dissenting opinions. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675. 
 89 The opinion also addressed jurisdictional concerns that are outside the scope of the 
present discussion. Id. at 2682. 
 90 Id. at 2689. 
 91 Winning Marriage: What We Need to Do, supra note 11. 
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district and appellate courts across the United States sided almost 
entirely with same-sex couples’ arguments that state failure to 
provide marriage equality violated both the Constitution’s equal 
protection and due process clauses. However, the lower courts were 
not entirely in agreement. Once the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit reversed lower federal district courts’ decisions 
striking down state bans on same-sex marriage creating a split 
amongst the federal circuit courts,92 the Supreme Court was finally 
ready to confront the question of marriage equality under the 
Constitution.   
In Obergefell v. Hodges (and consolidated cases), the majority 
declared that the due process and equal protection clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment required states to recognize same-sex 
marriage. 93 Twelve years earlier, in his dissenting opinion in 
Lawrence v. Texas, Justice Scalia wrote: “Today’s opinion dismantles 
the structure of constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to 
be made between heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as 
formal recognition in marriage is concerned.”94 He was correct. 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Obergefell majority, recalled that 
Lawrence’s protection of intimate association between consenting 
adults, regardless of their sex, is nonsensical if it stops at 
decriminalizing sexual intimacy.95 “Outlaw to outcast may be a step 
forward,” he wrote, “but it does not achieve the full promise of 
liberty.”96 
As had been the case in Windsor, Justice Kennedy devoted ample 
attention to the role of the state courts and state constitutions in 
leading to nation-wide marriage equality.97 Crucial to the Court’s 
decision to weigh in on marriage equality was the degree to which a 
“new and widespread discussion” of same-sex marriage had occurred 
 
 92 DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F. 3d 388, 421 (2014); Erik Eckholm, Court Upholds 
Marriage Ban in Four States, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/07/us/appeals-court-upholds-same-sex-marriage-ban.html. 
 93 Obergefell v. Hodges, 133 S.Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015). 
 94 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 95 Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2600. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. at 2595–97. 
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across the United States.98 The majority pointed to the Hawaii 
Supreme Court’s 1993 decision as instigating much of this 
discussion.99 In Baehr v. Lewin, the court concluded the 
classifications based on sex, like laws banning same-sex marriage, 
would be subject to the high bar of strict scrutiny.100 Although that 
decision did not result in marriage equality in Hawaii, it prompted 
debates about marriage equality across the country.101 In some states 
those debates led to legislation banning same-sex marriage and in 
others, laws creating civil unions or domestic partnerships. In some 
states the states courts were the forums for that debate; indeed, the 
majority specifically mentioned the landmark ruling by the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts holding that their state constitution 
protected the right of same-sex couples to marry.102 What is 
particularly clear in the majority’s opinion is the importance of state 
courts and state constitutional law in shaping the debate that would 
eventually turn on federal constitutional protections. 
 In fact, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of 
these lower federal and state court decisions, as well as state 
legislation, by including two appendices to its opinion.103 Appendix 
A lists all state and federal judicial decisions concerning marriage 
equality including United States Courts of Appeals decisions, United 
States District Court decisions and state high court decisions. 
Appendix B includes all state judicial and legislative action legalizing 
same-sex marriage. Had William Brennan been alive, he might well 
have written an addendum to his Harvard Law Review article and 
called it, “State Constitutionalism and the Protection of Individual 
Rights: The Case of Marriage Equality.” 
 But, it is worth emphasizing the important twist on judicial 
federalism discussed earlier in this paper and that Justice Kennedy 
 
 98 Id. at 2597. 
 99 Id.  
 100 Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 580 (1993). 
 101 KLARMAN, supra note 36, at 56–60. 
 102 Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2597. 
 103 Id. at 2608–11. 
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calls out in the Obergefell majority opinion:104 the state decisions on 
marriage equality were happening “against this background” of the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Bowers v. Hardwick,105 Romer v. 
Evans,106 and Lawrence v. Texas.107 Neither the actions of the state 
courts, nor that of the Supreme Court, occur in a legal vacuum. The 
Jersey City group knew that and planned accordingly. “At first, 
marriage will have to be won in the states, through state courts and 
state legislatures. Only after we have won in many states are we 
likely to be able to get the Supreme Court or Congress to insist that 
‘hold out’ states get in line.”108 
 By the time the Supreme Court reached its Obergefell 
decision, marriage equality was already a reality in thirty-six states 
and the District of Columbia. The Jersey City group’s 10/10/10/20 
plan had seriously underestimated the movement’s success and 
timetable. In 2015, only ten years after they summed up their work in 
the strategy memo, “Winning Marriage: What We Need to Do,” 
marriage equality was the law across the United States. Their state-
level strategy, which allowed for a piecemeal process utilizing the 
tenets of new judicial federalism, laid the necessary groundwork for 
the Supreme Court to “bring the ‘hold-out’ states into line” as 
required by the Constitution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 104 Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2597. In the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy distinguishes 
these state constitutional cases concerning marriage equality from the Court’s decisions on 
other gay rights issues. 
 105 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 106 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 107 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 108 Winning Marriage: What We Need to Do Now, supra note 11, at 14. 
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